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Abstract 
Increasing use of Internet all over the world has made world’s communication 
borderless. While such condition might benefited most people, however, it invites 
greater risks of misinformation and opportunities for detrimental self-expression. 
State’s control has various degree of manners in controlling a massive flow of 
information. This paper will examine the current methods of internet control utilized by 
the governments of China and Korea, and analyze the extent to which these respective 
regimes impinge on the human right to freedom of opinion and expression. It begins 
with an overview on the international standards for freedom of expression, and the 
limited permissible restrictions upon the right. Furthermore, the examination of the 
existing legislation and regimes implemented in China and Korea, respectively, and a 
comparison of features such as legal grounds and practical effectiveness will be 
undertaken. Finally, it will discuss whether the censorship regimes implemented in 
China and Korea constitute legitimate restrictions upon, or impermissibly violate, the 
right to freedom of expression. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid proliferation of 
Internet throughout the world has 
facilitated an unprecedented level of 
communication. Increased 
dissemination of information, however, 
invites greater risks of misinformation 
and opportunities for detrimental self-
expression. Today, almost every state 
controls online access to information in 
some way,1 though in varying manners 
and degrees.2 
The People’s Republic of China, 
which comprises the largest number of 
Internet users in the world, 3  and the 
                                                            
1 Kristen Farrell, ‘The Big Mamas Are 
Watching: China’s Censorship of the Internet 
and the Strain on Freedom of Expression’ 
(2007) 15 Michigan State Journal of 
International Law  577, 577. 
2  Farrell, above n 1, 577; Jessica E. 
Bauml, ‘It’s a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization 
and the Challenges Presented by Internet 
Censorship’ (2010) 63 Federal Communications 
Law Journal 697, 714. 
3  OpenNet Initiative, China: Country 
Profile (9 August 2012) OpenNet Initiative 
<http://access.opennet.net/wp-
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Republic of Korea (South Korea, 
hereafter referred to simply as ‘Korea’), 
the world leader in internet penetration,4 
both enact considerable restrictions 
upon internet activity through various 
filtering, surveillance and legislative 
methods. Although Korea today enjoys 
one of the most successful democracies 
in East Asia,5 the controls it exerts to 
regulate online activity are not as 
dissimilar to those of authoritarian 
China as may be expected. Despite the 
guarantees of freedom of expression in 
each of their respective Constitutions,6 
the restrictions placed upon online use 
by these two regimes may pose serious 
risks to citizens’ rights freedom of 
expression. 
                                                                                
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-
china.pdf> 276; citing International 
Telecommunication Union, Internet Indicators: 
Subscribers, Users and Broadband Subscribers 
(2009) <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/icteye/Reporting/ 
ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportName=/WTI/Inf
ormationTechnologyPublic&ReportFormat 
=HTML4.0&RP_intYear=2009&RP_intLangua
geID=1&RP_bitLiveData=False>. 
4  Eric Fish, ‘Is Internet Censorship 
Compatible With Democracy? Legal 
Restrictions of Online Speech in South Korea’ 
(2009) 2 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights 
and the Law 43, 50. 
5 Yun-han Chu et al., How East Asians 
View Democracy (Columbia University Press, 
2008) 28, cited in Fish, above n 4, 50. 
6  See «中华人民共和国宪法 » 
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] 
art 35; «대한민국 헌법» [Constitution of the 
Republic of Korea] art 21. 
This essay will examine the 
current methods of internet control 
utilised by the governments of China 
and Korea, and analyse the extent to 
which these respective regimes impinge 
on the human right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. Part I will 
provide an overview on the 
international standards for freedom of 
expression, and the limited permissible 
restrictions upon the right. Part II will 
examine the existing legislation and 
regimes implemented in China and 
Korea, respectively, and a comparison 
of features such as legal grounds and 
practical effectiveness will be 
undertaken in Part III. Finally, Part IV 
will discuss whether the censorship 
regimes implemented in China and 
Korea constitute legitimate restrictions 
upon, or impermissibly violate, the right 
to freedom of expression. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Since the paper will examine the 
current methods of internet control 
utilized by the governments of China 
and Korea, and analyze the extent to 
which these respective regimes impinge 
on the human right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, normative-
juridical research-method is applied. 
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The approach of this paper is the 
statute and comparative approach. This 
research will explore the comparison of 
state control on freedom of opinion and 
expression between China and Soth-
Korea. 
 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
FREEDOM OF OPINION AND 
EXPRESSION 
It is appropriate to begin with a 
look at the nature of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression. This 
right, also described as ‘freedom of 
speech’, is preserved in international 
law, both in the United Nation (UN)’s 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights7 (“UDHR”) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights8 
(“ICCPR”). Article 19 of the UDHR 
provides for the right to freedom of 
expression, which includes “freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers […] through any […] media of 
                                                            
7  Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 
1948). 
8 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976). 
his choice”.9 Article 19 of the ICCPR 
provides substantially the same right.10 
The UN’s Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and 
expression (“Special Rapporteur”) has 
recognised that the wording of Article 
19 of the UDHR includes and 
accommodates future technological 
developments, 11  and as such, it is 
accepted that the Internet (and other 
new communication technologies) is 
equally applicable under the existing 
framework of international human 
rights law.12 It must also be recognised 
that freedom of expression is not an 
absolute right. Article 19.3 provides that 
legitimate restrictions may be made, 
only ‘for the respect of the rights or 
reputations of others, the protection of 
                                                            
9  Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 
1948) art 19. 
10 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 19. 
11 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
Frank La Rue, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) 7 [21]. 
12 Ibid. 
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national security, public order, public 
health, or morals’.13 
Legitimacy based on the 
purposes set out in the article 19.3 is the 
second of three elements set out in the 
three-part, cumulative test framed by 
the Special Rapporteur. The first 
requirement is predictability and 
transparency (restrictions must be 
provided by law, which must be 
formulated with sufficient precision and 
made accessible to the public14), and the 
final element is necessity and 
proportionality (restrictions must be 
proven as necessary and the least 
restrictive means required to achieve the 
purported aim). 15  Variations of this 
three-part test have been used by 
international courts to examine 
limitations on freedom of expression,16 
and in Part III of this essay, these three 
elements will be used as means to 
                                                            
13 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 19.3. 
14 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
Frank La Rue, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) 8 [24]. 
15 Ibid. 
16  Philip Chwee, ‘Bringing in a New 
Scale: Proposing a Global Metric of Internet 
Censorship’ (2015) 38 Fordham International 
Law Journal 825, 836. 
assess the respective internet censorship 
regimes of China and Korea. 
 
INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN 
CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA 
A. China 
China’s legal and regulatory 
framework for internet control is 
considered to be the most advanced, 
complex and sophisticated regime of 
internet censorship in the world.17 
A number of laws and 
administrative regulations, in 
conjunction with a sophisticated 
technological framework, operate to 
control internet use in China using two 
main strategies: directly controlling 
internet activity through blocking and 
filtering methods, and inducing self-
censorship by internet users through 
surveillance and punitive sanctions. The 
‘Great Firewall of China’ is a highly 
sophisticated system of blocking and 
filtering techniques.18 In China, internet 
                                                            
17 Jessica E. Bauml, ‘It’s a Mad, Mad 
Internet: Globalization and the Challenges 
Presented by Internet Censorship’ (2010) 63 
Federal Communications Law Journal 697, 
702, citing Jan Bruck, Reporters Without 
Borders Warns Against Internet Censorship (3 
December 2010) <http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,5349061,00.html>; 
Reporters without Borders, List of the 13 
Internet Enemies (7 Nov 2006) 
<http://en.rsf.org/list-of-the-13-internet-
enemies-07-11-2006,19603>. 
18  Jeffrey Chien-Fei Li, ‘Internet 
Control or Internet Censorship? Comparing the 
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services are based on interconnecting 
networks, which all must pass through 
the Ministry of Information Industry’s 
international gateway. 19  As Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) can only 
access global networks through one of 
the interconnecting networks, all 
internet access through Chinese ISPs is 
effectively captured by the 
government’s filter.20 
The state is also able to regulate 
internet activity through Internet 
Information Service Providers (IISPs) 
and ISPs, by enforcing legislation which 
allocates liability to these bodies for the 
misconduct of their users. The 
Measures for Managing Internet 
Information Services21 (“the Measures”) 
adopted in 2000 create a number of 
legal obligations for IISPs and ICPs, 
which compel them to conduct their 
own censorship practices, in order to 
avoid various sanctions. 
                                                                                
Control Models of China, Singapore, and the 
United States to Guide Taiwan’s Choice’ (2013) 
14 Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law & 
Policy 1, 24. 
19 Jongpil Chung, ‘Comparing Online 
Activities in China and South Korea: The 
Internet and the Political Regime’ (2008) 48(5) 
Asian Survey 727, 734-735. 
20 Ibid. 
21  «互联网信息服务管理办法 » 
[Measures for Managing Internet Information 
Services] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, Order 
No 292, 20 September 2000. 
The Measures make IIS 
providers directly responsible for 
content published on their servers. 22 
They are prohibited by Article 15 from 
producing, reproducing, releasing or 
disseminating information that falls 
under the categories forbidden by the 
state, 23  and are further obliged by 
Article 16 to censor, record and report 
forbidden information. 24  Violation of 
these measures can make ICPs liable for 
fines, shutdown, criminal liability and 
licence revocation. 25  ISPs are also 
                                                            
22 OpenNet Initiative, China: Country 
Profile (9 August 2012) OpenNet Initiative 
<http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-
china.pdf> 276, 280; citing «互联网信息服务
管理办法» [Measures for Managing Internet 
Information Services] (People’s Republic of 
China) National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Order No 292, 20 September 2000, 
art 20. 
23  «互联网信息服务管理办法 » 
[Measures for Managing Internet Information 
Services] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, Order 
No 292, 20 September 2000, art 15. 
24  «互联网信息服务管理办法 » 
[Measures for Managing Internet Information 
Services] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, Order 
No 292, 20 September 2000, art 16. 
25 OpenNet Initiative, China: Country 
Profile (9 August 2012) OpenNet Initiative 
<http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-
china.pdf> 276, 280; citing «互联网信息服务
管理办法» [Measures for Managing Internet 
Information Services] (People’s Republic of 
China) National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Order No 292, 20 September 2000, 
art 20. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
22 
 
required by the Measures to record 
information relating to subscriber 
activity, and keep these records for 60 
days for supply upon demand by 
relevant state authorities.26 
Consequently, much of the 
implementation of internet censorship 
(such as keyword blocking and removal 
of search results 27 ) is carried out by 
IISPs and ISPs, who are controlled by 
the government through legal 
responsibilities. Additionally, a “virtual 
police” system employs around 30,000 
“cyber cops” to monitor online content, 
and selectively terminate domestic sites 
or block foreign sites that are found to 
disseminate ‘sensitive’ information.28 
A wide range of topics are 
considered sensitive by the Chinese 
government. 29  Blocked online content 
includes information relating to 
independence for Taiwan or Tibet, the 
Dalai Lama, Falun Gong, police 
brutality, Tiananmen Square, human 
                                                            
26  «互联网信息服务管理办法 » 
[Measures for Managing Internet Information 
Services] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, Order 
No 292, 20 September 2000, art 14. 
27  Farrell, above n 1, 586. 
28 Chung, above n 19, 735. 
29 Farrell, above n 1, 587.  
rights in China, democracy, as well as 
pornography and obscene content.30 
Aside from controlling what 
content is accessible by blocking and 
filtering, the state also controls internet 
use by inducing self-censorship by 
netizens. End users are subject to 
controls such as those issued by the 
Decision of the NPC Standing 
Committee on Safeguarding Internet 
Security (“the Decision”), 31  which 
prescribe sanctions including fines, 
content removal and criminal liability 
for violations.32 Numerous arrests have 
been made, not only of journalists, 
bloggers and activists, but even of 
‘ordinary’ users of social media.33 For 
example, in 2010, a Twitter user was 
arrested for retweeting a sarcastic 
comment about anti-Japanese protests in 
China.34 77 imprisonments of netizens 
were reported in 2009,35 and Amnesty 
                                                            
30 See Chung, above n 19, 735; Farrell, 
above n 1, 587. 
31 «全国人大常委会关于加强网络信
息保护的决定» [Decision of the NPC Standing 
Committee on Safeguarding Internet Security] 
(People’s Republic of China) National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, 28 December 
2000. 
32 OpenNet Initiative, China: Country 
Profile (9 August 2012) OpenNet Initiative 
<http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-
china.pdf> 276, 281. 
33 See Chung, above n 19, 737. 
34 OpenNet Initiative, above n 32. 
35 Ibid. 
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International has reported China to have 
the largest number of imprisoned 
journalists and cyber-dissidents in the 
world.36 
The threat of these sanctions pose even 
greater concern to netizens since the 
enactment in recent years of ‘real-name 
registration laws’, which require 
internet users to register their real name 
and personal information when signing 
up with ISPs or on websites such as 
microblogs and message boards. Users 
may use nicknames or pseudonyms 
online but their identities are still 
discoverable by the microblog 
companies and the government.37 
This scheme was first introduced 
on a national level in 2012 by the 
Decision, 38  which had the effect of 
creating the legal obligation of real-
name registration not only for blog 
                                                            
36 Jessica E. Bauml, ‘It’s a Mad, Mad 
Internet: Globalization and the Challenges 
Presented by Internet Censorship’ (2010) 63 
Federal Communications Law Journal 697, 
704, citing Amnesty International, Background 
Information on Freedom of Expression in China 
(2011) 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/individuals-at-
risk/priority-cases/background-information-on- 
shi-tao/page.do?id=1361025>. 
37  Jyh-An Lee and Ching-Yi Liu, 
‘Real-Name Registration Rules and the Fading 
Digital Anonymity in China’ (2015) 25 
Washington International Law Journal 1, 12. 
38  [Decision of the NPC Standing 
Committee on Safeguarding Internet Security] 
(People’s Republic of China) National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, 28 December 
2000. 
providers, but those who allow “website 
access” or “post[ing] information via 
the network”.39 The law has since been 
further expanded to instant messaging 
applications and mobile phone SIM 
card purchasers.40 
A draft “Cybersecurity Law” 
released in 2015 by the National 
People’s Congress in China also 
reiterates the current rules associated 
with real-name registration, 41  and 
imposes legal liability for violations by 
service providers, which include fines 
ranging between RMB 50,000 to 
500,000 ($10,000 to $100,000 AUD) 
and licence suspension. 42  It is 
speculated that the draft will be passed 
into law with very few changes, based 
on past legislative behaviour.43 
The combination of real-name 
registration, which removes anonymity 
                                                            
39 «全国人大常委会关于加强网络信
息保护的决定» [Decision of the NPC Standing 
Committee on Safeguarding Internet Security] 
(People’s Republic of China) National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, 28 December 
2000, art 6; cited in Lee and Liu, above n 37, 
13. 
40 Lee and Liu, above n 37, 13. 
41 [Cybersecurity Law (Draft)] 
(People’s Republic of China) National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, 7 July 2015, art 
20 [unofficial English translation found here: 
<http://chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritydraf
t/?lang=en>]. 
42  [Cybersecurity Law (Draft)] 
(People’s Republic of China) National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, 7 July 2015, art 
53. 
43 Lee and Liu, above n 37, 15. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
24 
 
from internet use, as well as the threat 
of punitive action, creates a chilling 
effect upon internet speech, by 
encouraging self-censorship for fear of 
punishment by the state. Research has 
even found that self-censorship caused 
by the suspicion and perception that one 
is being surveilled has been more 
effective than the Great Firewall at 
controlling internet use.44 
B. Republic of Korea 
The regulation of online content 
in Korea is largely enacted through the 
use of ‘takedown orders’ and 
defamation laws. The primary 
regulatory body is the Korea 
Communications Standard Commission 
(KCSC), which is empowered 45  to 
determine what content constitutes 
“unlawful information” on the 
internet, 46  and also make orders to 
intermediaries such as ICPs and website 
owners to block or shut down websites, 
                                                            
44 Davis, ‘China's Eye on the Internet’ 
ScienceDaily (online), 12 September 2007 
<https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/0
9/070911202441.htm> 
45 [Framework Act on 
Telecommunications] (Republic of Korea) 24 
January 2011, art 3. 
46 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
Frank La Rue, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/27 (21 March 2011) addendum 
2 (‘Mission to the Republic of Korea’) 9 [32]. 
delete messages, and/or suspend users,47 
pursuant to the Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications 
Network Utilization and Information 
Protection, etc. (“the Network Act”).48 
Under Article 44-7 of the 
Network Act, which prohibits the 
circulation of ‘unlawful’ information, 
the KCSC can order a provider of 
information communications services or 
a message board operator to reject, 
suspend or restrict such information.49 
Failure by a person responsible for an 
online provider or message board to 
comply with such a request is 
punishable by a fine of up to ten million 
won or imprisonment for up to two 
years.50 
This legislation creates liability 
for information communications service 
providers in respect to their users’ 
                                                            
47  OpenNet Initiative, South Korea: 
Country Profile (6 August 2012) OpenNet 
Initiative <http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-south-
korea.pdf> 355. 
48  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012. 
49  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 44-7. 
50  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 73(5); Mission to the 
Republic of Korea, UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 12 [44]. 
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actions. Internet portals have been 
found liable by the Supreme Court for 
failing to delete defamatory and 
malicious comments posted on their 
news services websites, and have been 
ordered to pay compensation of up to 
KRW 30 million ($30,000 AUD) in 
damages to victims of defamation. 51 
The threat of these significant sanctions 
act to equip the KCSC with a 
considerable amount of authority over 
intermediaries in regulating online 
content.52 
Internet intermediaries are also 
required to play a role in online 
censorship through operation of Article 
44-2 of the Network Act. This provision 
allows victims of defaming or otherwise 
personally harmful information to 
request the relevant provider of 
information and communications 
services to delete the information. 53 
Upon receipt of such a request, the 
provider, or intermediaries, must take 
action to delete or block access to the 
                                                            
51 Park Sungwoo and Kim Miju, ‘Court 
says Web portals are responsible for comments’ 
Korea JoongAng Daily (online), 18 April 2009 
<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/artic
le/article.aspx?aid=2903746>. 
52  Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 12 
[44]. 
53  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 44-2. 
information for up to 30 days. 54 During 
such a suspension, the KCSC will 
determine whether the information is to 
be allowed or deleted. However, the 
operation of Article 44-2 means that 
information claimed to be fraudulent or 
scandalous can be blocked immediately, 
before an actual determination is made 
about the legitimacy of the complaints. 
Although the problem of cyber-
bullying was cited as the main 
justification for introduction of this law 
in 2008, 55  many have perceived the 
measures as a method of controlling 
online discussion for the KCSC. 56 
Critics have pointed to cases that appear 
to suggest that this power has been 
exercised in relation to political 
discussion or policy-based criticism of 
government officials.57 
Moreover, Article 44-3 
encourages intermediaries to monitor 
and take temporary measures at their 
own discretion, even without 
complaints. 58  Article 44-2(6) further 
provides that if a provider takes 
necessary measures, it may have its 
                                                            
54 OpenNet Initiative, above n 47, 355. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See Fish, above n 4, 86. 
57 Ibid 86-88. 
58  See [Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications Network 
Utilization and Information Protection, etc] 
(Republic of Korea) 18 August 2012, art 44-3. 
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liability for damages mitigated or 
discharged.59 The combination of these 
two provisions create a concern that 
intermediaries may be inclined to ‘err 
on the side of safety’ by overusing their 
vague scope of discretion in Article 44-
3 to avoid liability.60 
Regulation of online content in 
Korea is generally directed at ‘socially 
harmful content’ and content relating to 
national security, in particular content 
relating to North Korea. 61  Content 
containing North Korea propaganda 
falls under the classification of “illegal 
content” due to operation of the 
National Security Act,62 which prohibits 
content which “praises, promotes, and 
glorifies North Korea”.63 Blocking of 27 
foreign sites, 338 social networking 
accounts and 132 online communities, 
and deletion of 15,168 items of 
propaganda for jeopardising national 
                                                            
59  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 44-2(6). 
60  Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 11. 
61 OpenNet Initiative, above n 47, 360. 
62  «국가보안법» [National Security 
Act] (Republic of Korea) 1948. 
63  Freedom House, Freedom on the 
Net: South Korea (2014) Freedom House 
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/res
ources/South%20Korea.pdf> 5. 
security were reported by police in 
2013.64 
Individuals have also been 
arrested for discussing North Korea 
online. In 2002, a Democratic Labor 
Party activist, Kim Kangpil, was 
accused of committing “an act 
advantageous to the enemy” under 
Article 7 of the National Security Act 
and sentenced to one year’s 
imprisonment for posting articles about 
North Korea on the party’s website.65 
Another of the central priorities 
of Korea’s online filtering policy is 
protection of the youth from “harmful” 
internet content, described as “immoral, 
violent, obscene, speculative and 
antisocial information”. 66  Article 42-2 
of the Network Act provides that those 
who transmit “unwholesome media” as 
defined by the Juvenile Protection Act 
must take measures to restrict access to 
juveniles,67 and Article 42 requires that 
websites containing adult content must 
                                                            
64 Ibid; citing Hongdu Park [In Park’s 
first year, the number of violators of the 
National Security Act has leaped] 경량 신문 
(online), 19 February 2014 
<http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_vie
w.html?artid=201402190924151&code=940202
>. 
65 Chung, above n 19, 739. 
66 OpenNet Initiative, above n 47, 354. 
67  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 42-2. 
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warn visitors and require identification 
verification for access.68 
Homosexual content was 
classified as “obscenity and perversion” 
in the 2001 “Internet Content Rating 
Service”, 69  designed to protect 
adolescents from viewing content 
deemed by officials as “illegal and 
harmful materials” online.70   Gay and 
lesbian websites were classified as 
“harmful” to minors and youth, and 
<www.exzone.com>, a website about 
gay and lesbian issues, was shut down 
as a result.71 However, this practice was 
reversed by 2003 due to international 
backlash,72 influence from Seoul High 
Court dicta stating that preventing 
youths from viewing homosexual 
content might be unconstitutional, as 
well as a recommendation by the 
National Human Rights Commission.73 
Another important method of 
controlling online speech is through the 
penalties for “cyber defamation”, which 
are specifically provided in the Network 
                                                            
68  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 42; OpenNet Initiative, 
above n 47, 354. 
69 Chung, above n 19, 739. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Fish, above n 4, 77, 94. 
73 Ibid 78. 
Act. 74  A person who defames another 
through an information and 
communications network is punishable 
by imprisonment for up to three years or 
by fine not exceeding 20 million won 
for facts, or imprisonment up to ten 
years or by fine not exceeding 50 
million won for false facts.75 
The penalties for cyber defamation are 
noticeably stronger than those 
prescribed for defamation in the 
criminal law. Under Article 307 of the 
Criminal Act, defamation is punishable 
by imprisonment for up to two years or 
by fine not exceeding five million won 
for facts, or imprisonment up to ten 
years or by fine not exceeding ten 
million won for false facts.76 The higher 
speed and wider audience reach of 
online communication have been cited 
as reasons for the harsher penalties.77 
The Network Act’s stated 
purpose includes an aim of “developing 
an environment in which people can 
utilize information and communications 
                                                            
74  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 70. 
75  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 70. 
76 «형법» [Criminal Act] (Republic of 
Korea) 3 October 1953, art 307. 
77 Freedom House, above n 63, 11. 
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networks in a sounder and safer way.”78 
However, concern has been expressed 
that the cyber defamation laws have 
been used to target statements that are 
true and in the public interest and 
penalise individuals who express 
criticisms of the government.79 
 
COMPARISON 
A. Regulated Content 
The legal grounds for internet 
censorship in China are found in Article 
15 of the Measures, and include: 
national security and national unity, 
state interest and honour, ethnic 
discrimination, state policy towards 
religion, social order and stability, the 
regulation of pornography, gambling, 
violence, homicide or terrorism, human 
dignity, and rights infringement.80 
Research indicates that China’s 
internet blocking is primarily focused 
on content that has the potential to 
undermine the authority of the 
Communist government and its control 
                                                            
78 [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 1. 
79  Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 8 
[25]. 
80   [Measures for Managing Internet 
Information Services] (People’s Republic of 
China) National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Order No 292, 20 September 2000, 
art 15. 
over social stability,81 as well as content 
that relates to politically sensitive 
issues. 82  Chinese filtering also targets 
‘socially harmful’ content, primarily 
websites related to pornography and 
online gambling. 83  The legal grounds 
for blocking online content in Korea are 
found in the nine categories of 
forbidden information provided by 
Article 44-7 of the Network Act. These 
grounds include obscenity, defamation, 
creating fear, protection for juveniles 
against “unwholesome” material, state 
secrets, activity prohibited by the 
National Security Act, and criminal 
activity.84 
Testing conducted by OpenNet 
Initiative consistently finds that filtering 
in Korea primarily targets content 
related to conflict and security, 
particularly regarding North Korea. 85 
Besides protection of national security, 
however, online regulation in Korea 
also has a significant emphasis on 
protection against defamation and 
abusive behaviour, and protection 
against ‘harmful material’ including 
                                                            
81 OpenNet Initiative, above n 47, 287. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84  [Act on Promotion of Information 
and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc] (Republic of Korea) 
18 August 2012, art 44-7. 
85 OpenNet Initiative, above n 47, 360. 
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gambling, pornography, nudity and 
sexual violence.86 
A comparison of the categories 
of content subject to online regulation in 
these two countries reveal a number of 
similarities. Although Korea does not 
engage in the same level of filtering as 
China,87 both countries primarily focus 
on content that each respective state 
considers a threat to its political 
stability. China blocks content relating 
to issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, 
while Korea blocks content relating to 
North Korea. Both countries also 
engage in online censorship for the 
purposes of protecting society from 
perceived moral or social harms such as 
gambling and pornography. This 
paternalistic approach is markedly 
Asian in nature, and reveals the 
Confucian ideology that both countries 
share.88 
B. Methods of censorship 
While both countries use some 
similar methods to regulate online 
activity, they rely more heavily on 
different strategies. In China, the focus 
                                                            
86 See ibid. 
87 See ibid; OpenNet Initiative, above n 
32. 
88 See Jong-Sung You, ‘The Cheonan 
Dilemmas and the Declining Freedom of 
Expression in South Korea’ (Paper presented at 
the 2014 International Studies Association 
annual convention, Toronto, Canada, 28 March 
2014) 23. 
is on the extensive filtering capabilities 
of the Great Firewall. In Korea, on the 
other hand, the level of filtering is 
“generally low” 89 , and the state’s 
approach is more dependent on other 
measures such as takedown orders and 
defamation laws.90 
Both countries use strategies to induce 
self-censorship in addition to directly 
controlling accessibility of online 
content. China’s surveillance of internet 
users and arrests of cyber-dissidents 
creates a chilling effect in respect to 
political speech, while a degree of self-
censorship in relation to abusive speech 
is encouraged by the threat of cyber 
defamation laws in Korea. 
C. Cyber defamation 
While China has criminal laws 
applying to defamatory statements 
alleging false facts, 91  Korea’s law is 
even stricter in that it also punishes true 
facts.  Korean law also distinguishes 
Cyber Defamation as a distinct offence, 
unlike China, whose legislation 
specifies that online expression falls 
under the basic criminal laws for 
                                                            
89 See OpenNet Initiative, above n 47, 
360. 
90 Ibid. 
91 John M. Leitner, ‘To Post or Not to 
Post: Korean Criminal Sanctions for Online 
Expression’ (2010) 25 Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal 43, 66. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
30 
 
defamation. 92  China applies the same 
punishment for defamation, regardless 
of medium of expression, while the 
cyber defamation laws in Korea are 
prescribed higher maximum penalties 
than defamation expressed in other 
mediums. 
This difference may be 
explained by the unique socio-cultural 
context of Korean society, and events 
that have led to a stronger drive for 
protection against defamatory speech. 
The primarily cited motivation for 
Korea’s online restriction relating to 
defamatory comments and online 
speech stems from the problem of 
‘cyber-bullying’ in Korean society. 93 
Societal factors which contribute to the 
high numbers of suicides triggered by 
online speech include the high 
penetration of Internet use in Korean 
society, a small number of universally 
used discussion sites, and a cultural 
emphasis on ‘keeping face’. 94  The 
suicide of the “Nation’s Actress”, Choi 
Jinsil, in 2008 due to false rumours, 
among a number of other high-profile 
celebrity suicides linked to online 
rumours, have prompted public support 
for increased governmental control of 
                                                            
92 Ibid. 
93 See Fish, above n 4, 84-85. 
94 Fish, above n 4, 84. 
online communication. 95  This social 
issue, although not unique, bears a 
heavier impact in Korean society, and 
has motivated the introduction of 
measures such as cyber defamation laws 
in Korea.96 
D. Real name registration 
China and Korea are the only 
two countries in the world to have 
adopted systems of online real-name 
registration. 97  Although only China 
currently has this scheme in place, it 
was first introduced in Korean law.98 
The real-name system was introduced in 
Korea in 2009 as a response to the 
‘cyber-bullying’ suicide events 
discussed above.99  Article 44-5 of the 
Network Act required real identity 
verification of online users of websites 
with more than 100,000 visitors a 
day. 100  The scheme, however, was 
                                                            
95 Fish, above n 4, 84-85. 
96 See Fish, above n 4. 
97 Fish, above n 4, 84. 
98 David A. Caragliano, ‘Real Names 
and Responsible Speech: The Cases of South 
Korea, China, and Facebook’ (Paper presented 
at The Right to Information & Transparency in 
the Digital Age, Stanford University, 11-12 
March 2013); Lee and Liu, above n 37; John 
Leitner, ‘Identifying the Problem: Korea’s 
Initial Experience with Mandatory Real Name 
Verification on Internet Portals’ (2009) 9 
Journal of Korean Law 83. 
99  John Leitner, ‘Identifying the 
Problem: Korea’s Initial Experience with 
Mandatory Real Name Verification on Internet 
Portals’ (2009) 9 Journal of Korean Law 83, 
86-94. 
100 Ibid 90. 
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abandoned after a unanimous ruling by 
the Constitutional Court of Korea that 
Article 44-5 was unconstitutional in 
2012. 101  The Court found that ‘the 
public gains achieved had not been 
substantial enough to justify restrictions 
on individuals’ rights to free speech’.102 
Although China originally introduced 
the system based on the Korean 
model, 103  it has declined to follow 
Korea’s abandonment of the scheme, 
and continues to advocate the real-name 
registration system in its new 2015 draft 
law. 
E. Practical effectiveness 
The methods employed by 
China and Korea to censor online 
content face some challenges in respect 
to practical application. Blocking of 
content, by both countries, can be 
circumvented by methods including 
proxy servers or Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs). 104  The “Network 
Authoritarian Model” 105  used by the 
Chinese government to take advantage 
                                                            
101 Freedom House, above n 63, 12. 
102 ‘South Korea’s real-name net law is 
rejected by court’ , BBC (online), 23 August 
2012 < http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
19357160>. 
103 Lee and Liu, above n 37, 16. 
104 Jessica E. Bauml, ‘It’s a Mad, Mad 
Internet: Globalization and the Challenges 
Presented by Internet Censorship’ (2010) 63 
Federal Communications Law Journal 697, 
729. 
105 Lee and Liu, above n 37, 3. 
of the business sector’s profit-driven 
motives and corporate resources relies 
upon compliance by private ISPs. This 
presents a challenge when ISPs do not 
have incentive or ability to cooperate, 
which is beginning to surface with the 
introduction of real-name registration 
rules which create overwhelming 
compliance costs, 106  resulting in 
inconsistencies and uncertainties in 
enforcement. 107  Uneven application of 
the law has undermined the 
effectiveness of the real-name 
registration system in Korean 
experience.108 
Korea’s methods are unable to 
control foreign websites. 109  While the 
Chinese filtering system requires access 
to all foreign sites to pass through the 
government-controlled networks, and 
threatens to kick out foreign websites 
that fail to comply,110 Korea’s limited 
internet filtering prevents access to only 
a limited number of websites, and the 
Korean government has thus far been 
unwilling to kick out major websites 
                                                            
106 Ibid 23-26. 
107 Ibid. 
108 David A. Caragliano, ‘Real Names 
and Responsible Speech: The Cases of South 
Korea, China, and Facebook’ (Paper presented 
at The Right to Information & Transparency in 
the Digital Age, Stanford University, 11-12 
March 2013) 6. 
109 Fish, above n 4, 92. 
110 Ibid. 
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(such as Youtube and Google) for 
failing to comply with its laws. 111 
Another obstacle for Korea’s regime is 
the inability of the KCSC to handle the 
number of complaints it receives.112 It is 
estimated that to deal with the hundreds 
and thousands of articles and comments 
for which it receives complaints, the 
Commission would need to hire 
thousands more employees. 113  In 
comparison to these weaknesses in the 
Korean model, the Chinese regime of 
online censorship and its highly 
advanced Great Firewall filtering 
system is much more effective at 
controlling online content. 
 
LEGITIMATE RESTRICTIONS TO 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 
A. Legal grounds 
Pursuant to Article 19.3 of the 
ICCPR, restrictions upon the right to 
expression are only permissible ‘for the 
respect of the rights or reputations of 
others, the protection of national 
security, public order, public health, or 
morals’. 114  In respect to protection of 
morals, it is emphasised by the UN 
                                                            
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 19.3. 
Human Rights Committee (“the 
Committee”) that “the concept of 
morals derives from many social, 
philosophical and religious traditions” 
and that “limitations must be 
understood in the light of universality of 
human rights”. 115  As such, China and 
Korea’s relatively paternalistic 
approaches to online regulation in 
regards to content such as pornography 
and gambling should be accepted, as 
they are informed by cultural 
conceptions of morals which are 
legitimate for the contexts in which they 
operate. 
However, while some of the 
legal grounds provided in the Chinese 
and Korean legislation authorising 
blocking/deletion of online information 
do fall under the permissible grounds 
(such as child protection), a number of 
grounds have been criticised for being 
too broad and vague. 
Legal grounds provided in 
Article 15 of China’s Measures, such as 
national unity, state honour and social 
order, are found to be ‘relatively 
abstract and overbroad’ 116  and 
                                                            
115 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 19, General Comment 
23, quoted in Li, above n 18, 19. 
116 Li, above n 24. 
Brawijaya Law Journal v.3 n.1 2016             Law and Human Right Issues
     
33 
 
‘needlessly vague’. 117  The prohibited 
categories of information in Article 44-
7(1) of Korea’s Network Act similarly 
lack clarity. The prohibition on “content 
that attempts, aids or abets to commit a 
crime” has been identified as too broad 
by the Special Rapporteur,118 especially 
considering the wording of some crimes 
such as “obstruction of business”. 119 
The vagueness of these broad grounds 
for censorship is problematic, as they 
create too much ambiguity to operate as 
the precise restrictions allowed by 
Article 19.3. 
B. Proportionality 
Even where restrictions are 
based on acceptable legal grounds, they 
are also required by Article 19.3 of the 
ICCPR to be necessary and the least 
restrictive means required to achieve the 
purported aim. 120  The Committee has 
stated that “[t]he penalization of a 
media outlet, publishers or journalist 
solely for being critical of the 
government or the political social 
system espoused by the government can 
                                                            
117 Jessica E. Bauml, ‘It’s a Mad, Mad 
Internet: Globalization and the Challenges 
Presented by Internet Censorship’ (2010) 63 
Federal Communications Law Journal 697, 
705. 
118 Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 12 
[45]. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
never be considered to be a necessary 
restriction of freedom of expression”.121 
Many of the arrests of individuals in 
China and Korea for online speech have 
been disproportionate, as they have 
related to speech considered obscene or 
scandalous, or political without posing 
any threat to national security. 122  As 
filtering can provide less restrictive 
means of dealing with subversive 
speech, the criminal punishment of 
imprisonment is clearly 
disproportionate in these cases, and 
constitutes impermissible restrictions of 
freedom of expression.  
The Committee has further 
stated that Article 19.3 requires 
permissible restrictions to be “content-
specific” 123  and “generic bans on the 
operation of certain sites and systems 
are not allowed.” 124  A system that 
utilises general filtering and a blocking 
list, like China’s Great Firewall, is not 
necessary, as there is no “direct and 
immediate connection between the 
                                                            
121 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 12, General Comment 
27, [42], quoted in Li, above n 18, 20. 
122 See OpenNet Initiative, above n 32. 
123 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 12, General Comment 
27, [43], quoted in Li, above n 18, 21. 
124 Ibid. 
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expression and the threat”.125 Although 
Korea’s system of takedown orders 
blocks content reactively rather than 
proactively, there are still concerns 
about the Network Act’s delegation of 
responsibility to intermediaries rather 
than an independent body, especially 
considering provisions that give 
intermediaries a vague discretion to 
block information that is likely to be 
over-applied to avoid liability. 126  The 
excessive authority given to 
intermediaries to regulate online content 
may indicate that this system also fails 
the necessity test. 
Korea’s cyber defamation laws 
also fail on proportionality, as their 
‘inherently harsh’ sanctions of up to ten 
years imprisonment or up to 50 million 
won ($50,000) impose disproportionate 
penalties. 127  They are even more 
disproportionate in respect to 
defamation for true facts. The real-name 
registration scheme currently 
implemented in China is also 
disproportionate to its purported aim of 
addressing online malicious speech, 
pornography and “unfounded 
                                                            
125 Li, above n 18, 39. 
126 Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 11 
[41]. 
127 Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 8 
[28]. 
rumours” 128 . Korea’s experience with 
this scheme has highlighted numerous 
problems, including privacy violations, 
cyber security, and practical 
enforcement issues. 129  Considering 
these factors, the Constitutional Court 
of Korea has found that the scheme’s 
benefits were not sufficient to justify the 
significant restrictions it imposed on 
citizens’ right to free speech. 130 
Additionally, there exist other less 
restrictive methods to trace online 
users131 or to remedy harm done by a 
person’s expression.132 
C. Predictability and 
transparency 
The criterion of predictability 
and transparency requires that 
restrictions must be formulated with 
sufficient precision and made accessible 
to the public.133 
China’s regime of internet filtering fails 
to meet the transparency requirements 
                                                            
128 Lee and Liu, above n 37, 16. 
129 See Lee and Liu, above n 37. 
130 Identity Verification System on the 
Internet 47, 252(consolidated), August 23, 
2012] <http://search.ccourt.go.kr/>. 
131 Ibid 23-30. 
132 Caragliano, above n 108, 7. 
133  Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, 17th sess, Agenda 
Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) 8 
[24]. 
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of Article 19.3, with results from 
OpenNet Initiative testing reporting a 
low level of transparency, due to the 
lack of a publicly available list of 
banned sites, as well as no available 
mechanisms for users to request review 
of blocked sites.134 It is also not obvious 
when a website has been blocked, as 
blocked sites will redirect users to a 
network timeout error page, which can 
be attributed to network errors.135 
It is also important that legislation 
restricting the right to freedom of 
expression is applied by a body which is 
independent of any political, 
commercial, or other unwarranted 
influences, in a manner that is neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory, with 
adequate safeguards against abuse.136 
The constitution and procedures 
of the KCSC have raised serious 
concerns that there are insufficient 
safeguards to ensure that it does not 
operate as a de facto post-publication 
censorship body to delete information 
critical of the Government or powerful 
                                                            
134 OpenNet Initiative, above n 32, 287. 
135 Ibid. 
136  Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, 17th sess, Agenda 
Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) 8 
[24]. 
corporations.137 Although the KCSC is 
a nominally independent statutory 
organisation, its nine members are 
appointed by the President, 138  which 
raises questions about its independence, 
given the degree of influence that can 
be exerted by the President and 
dominant political party.139 
Concerns have also have been 
expressed about the lack of 
transparency, accountability and 
scrutiny of the KCSC. 140  The 
procedures of removing illegal online 
content do not notify authors of blocked 
or deleted content nor allow them to 
provide their opinion before the 
KCSC’s decision.141 While authors can 
challenge the commission directly about 
a ruling, they have no independent 
avenue for appeal. 142  This raises 
concerns that judgements made by the 
KCSC may be arbitrary and politically, 
                                                            
137 Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 12 
[47]. 
138  Freedom House, above n 63, 6, 
citing Jeong-hwan Lee, ‘A private organization 
under the president? The KCSC’s structural 
irony’ (in Korean), Media Today (online), 14 
September 2011, <http://bit.ly/1aYr0GA>. 
139  See Mission to the Republic of 
Korea, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, 
addendum 2, 9 [32]. 
140  See Mission to the Republic of 
Korea, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, 
addendum 2, 12. 
141 Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 12 
[47]; Freedom House, above n 63, 4. 
142 Freedom House, above n 63, 6. 
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socially or culturally motivated, lacking 
legal grounds. 143  It has been reported 
that the KCSC in many cases has 
blocked entire blogs even where only a 
small portion of posts are deemed 
problematic.144 
The National Human Rights 
Commission of Korea’s 
recommendation that the authority and 
functions of the KCSC be transferred to 
an independent self-regulatory body 
with higher transparency and 
accountability 145  would be appropriate 
to ensure that online regulation which 
amounts to restriction of the freedom of 
expression is carried out in a more 
legitimate manner. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Freedom of expression is a 
fundamental human right, and the 
importance in its preservation is 
reflected by the extremely limited 
nature of the acceptable grounds for 
restriction in ICCPR Article 19.3. By 
failing to comply with the requirements 
of Article 19.3, the internet censorship 
regimes of China and South Korea 
                                                            
143 Mission to the Republic of Korea, 
UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, addendum 2, 12; 
Freedom House, above n 63, 6. 
144 Freedom House, above n 63, 6. 
145  See Mission to the Republic of 
Korea, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27/Add.2, 
addendum 2, 12. 
constitute violations of the rights 
provided by Article 19 and guaranteed 
by their own Constitutions. 
Even more problematic than 
direct methods of censorship, are the 
measures that have been taken to 
conduct surveillance upon citizens, or 
punish individuals for their online 
speech. Governmental censorship 
against a specific speaker, along with 
paranoia and fear of sanctions, create a 
culture of self-censorship. 146  Self-
censorship may create a chilling effect, 
which, in turn, can effect mass 
censorship.147 
While the internet regulatory 
regimes in China and Korea share some 
similarities, however, their impacts are 
not the same. Although they both 
regulate online content on relatively 
similar grounds, and censor directly as 
well as inducing self-censorship, the 
major difference lies in the degree to 
which they exert control over political 
speech. While internet users are 
prohibited from raising anti-government 
issues in China, netizens in Korea are 
free to discuss or even criticise 
government policies and political 
                                                            
146 Li, above n 18, 17. 
147  Ibid, citing N.Y. Times Co. v 
Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (quoting 
Smith v California (1959) 361 U.S. 147, 153-
54). 
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leaders, provided the speech does not 
endanger ‘national security’ or 
constitute ‘cyber defamation’. 148  This 
key difference preserves the distinction 
between China’s authoritarian state, and 
Korea’s democracy, for which freedom 
of expression and political critique is 
essential. However, there is a still a 
need for redress of both regimes, in 
order to protect the rights to self-
expression of citizens in China and 
Korea. Both states must find a balance, 
to regulate online activity for the benefit 
of their citizens, but only through 
restrictions to the right to freedom of 
expression for reasons and in ways that 
are legitimately permissible by 
international law. 
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